When a user is authenticated with a web service, an attacker can use cross-site request forgery (CSRF) to trick them into making a request to that service to perform a desired action.

If a service uses GET requests for state-changing operations, the attacker could present the user with a link that triggers an unwanted update. POST requests can be triggered with a form submission. Both can be generated without deliberate action from the user, for example by embedding an image tag that links to a protected resource on the target service, or by including some JavaScript that submits a form on a mouseover event. An attacker could include malicious links or code on their own site, or embed either elsewhere, particularly where there is a cross-site scripting vulnerability.


HTTP methods should be used as intended. Specifically, use POST not GET for state-changing operations. Assuming that this is the case, GET requests can be considered safe: even if a request is unintended, its response is just returned harmlessly to the user’s browser.

POST requests can be protected by including a security token, verified by the server, in forms and AJAX requests, as happens in Ruby on Rails.

GET requests for dynamic JavaScript resources can be vulnerable, as an attacker could include such a script in a <script> tag on their own page, and potentially extract user data after the script has executed (e.g. from a global variable). Rails prevents embedding of JavaScript responses by default for this reason.

The same-origin policy

Whilst an attacker cannot use CSRF to steal data returned from a GET request, they could theoretically do so by executing a script that makes an AJAX request to a third-party service with the user’s credentials and then forwards the response. Happily, browsers enforce the same-origin policy to protect against this.

The origin of a web page is generally the scheme, host and port taken together. Requests to a different origin than that of the requesting page are known as cross-origin requests. When a browser makes a cross-origin request as part of an AJAX call, the same-origin policy ensures that it will raise an error and not share the response with the calling code. The policy is intended to isolate content from different sources within the browser, and prevents AJAX requests from being used to read a user’s data from a third-party service.

‘Simple’ cross-origin requests (GET, HEAD and POST, with certain content types) are attempted without preceding checks. Other requests (e.g. POST with JSON or XML content, PUT, DELETE) are subject to a preflight OPTIONS request to determine whether or not the request is safe to send. This is mostly to protect older servers that might not be aware that browsers are now able to perform these cross-origin requests. Note that it is still necessary to take measures to protect against cross-origin POST requests made via AJAX, which have always been possible.


Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is a mechanism that allows site owners to selectively relax the same-origin policy by configuring their web server to set certain headers. Setting the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to a given origin, for example, will enable the browser to make cross-origin requests from this origin.

For credentials (cookies) to be used in such requests, they must be explicitly included in the request itself, and the Access-Control-Allow-Credentials header must be set.